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Questions & Answers  

Unless otherwise noted, responses are formulated by the editor with the assistance of NNN's network of experts. Correspondents' names and places of residence are indicated unless otherwise requested.
   
Arbetsmotivationens förutsättningar
Commentary on research findings concerning unemployed individuals' motivation to work

Confronting a 900-pound gorilla
Commentary on the current state of social democracy in Europe

The Business of World Domination
Question regarding the ambition of the United States to dominate the entire planet

Sweden during World War II
Question regarding Sweden's alleged collaboration with Nazi Germany


      

Commentary
By Håkan Sundin
Sweden
    
This commentary refers to an article written in Swedish, with an English summary. Mr. Sundin questions the prevailing assumption of free will in relation to the motivation to work. While granting that it would be difficult to sustain any society without inputs of human labour, he argues that unemployment is usually beyond the conrol of the individual. The only healthy response, then, is "to enjoy being jobless".

He also argues that competition suits some personalities better than others. Those who view society as a co-operative enterprise have little interest in competing, and feel that "society can never be tetter than its most disadvantaged citizens". They reject the competition that permeates society, and become alienated. In this context, their motivation to work is "unusually low because they have an unusually high moral standard". To be morally acceptable, work must promote social equality and the needs of the disadvantaged. "One should not be forced to help those who are already well off to acquire an even more inquitous share of wealth."

For those who thrive on competition, it offers a kind of freedom. But for the less competitve, it creates pressure to behave in ways that are disagreeable: "One feels like a slave", and this is not a state of mind that can be dismissed by an act of will. It is necessary, instead, to create conditions that elicit the motivation of those who prefer co-operation to competition.
Arbetsmotivationens förutsättningar

Mikael Nordenmarks uppsats ("Arbetets psyko-sociala värde") hävdar att man inte behöver sätta press på arbetslösa för att de ska komma in på arbetsmarknaden, för de vill själva detta. Det är mycket fint att detta rön kommer fram i debatten.

Men man kan också fundera över en annan sak: Om det vore så att arbetslösa hade en låg motivation för förvärsarbete, innebure det verkligen att det vore rätt att sätta en press på dessa att arbeta? Uppfattningen att det är rätt bygger ju, såvitt jag förstår, på föreställningen att man själv råder över sin motivation, att man så att säga kan välja att känna sig motiverad eller ej, och att de som inte vill det så att säga har gjort ett felaktigt val.

Man kan förvisso säga att detta, att inte vilja arbeta, är ett felaktigt tillstånd, då ju samhället inte kan bestå utan medborgarens arbetsinsats därför. Men föreställningen att individens arbete inte behövs är inte skapad av individen själv, utan av hans yttre livserfarenheter, då han ju drabbats av den arbetslöshet som är en del av det moderna samhällets struktur. Det är ju samhället som säger till individen: "du behövs inte, samhället behöver dig inte".

Kan då individen klandras, om han tror vad samhället säger till honom och anpassar sig till sin situation genom att tänka: "Om jag inte får något arbete, då är det inte heller någon mening med att vilja det. Eftersom jag är arbetslös, så är jag lyckligast om jag trivs med att vara arbetslös. Samhället har ingen rätt att ta ifrån mig min rätt att trivas med mitt liv genom att anpassa mig till min situation som arbetslös."

Vidare bör man betänka, att konkurrensen i samhället mentalt passar vissa människor bättre än andra. Vissa är tävlingsmänniskor, och för dem är det naturligt att samhället är ett ojämlikt system som det gäller att lyckas bra som individ i, och där man blir en vinnare om man lyckas bättre än andra.

För dem som inte alls är tävlingsmänniskor är konkurrensen i samhället ett främmande och oförståeligt fenomen. Dessa människor anser att samhället är ett gemensamt projekt. De tycker innerst inne att samhället aldrig kan bli bättre än sin sämst ställda medborgare. Att sträva efter egna fördelar medan andra blir kvar i skiten är för dem ett ytterst omoraliskt beteende. De tycker, vare sig de kan sätta ord på sina känslor eller ej, att det är skandallöst att detta beteende framhålls som förebildligt i hela samhället från skolan ut i arbetslivet, och detta faktum gör att de känner sig främmande i samhället. "Detta samhälle är inte till för sådana som mig", känner de.

Detta har också relevans för motivationen till förvärsarbete i detta system. Nämligen på så sätt, att dessa människor har en ovanligt låg motivation för förvärvsarbete därför att de har ovanligt hög moral. Att inte vilja förvärvsarbeta kan alltså inte anses som en entydigt omoralisk inställning för att det innebär att individen undandrar sig sin arbetsplikt gentemot samhället. Individen kan nämligen känna att han/hon inte erbjuds någon möjlighet att fullgöra denna plikt på ett för honom/henne moraliskt godtagbart sätt. Moraliskt godtagbart kan här betyda tillfredsställande jämlikt, och att arbetet i princip är en insats för dem som har det sämst i samhället och inte att man tvingas hjälpa dem som redan har det bra till ännu mer orättvist välstånd.

Det bör också nämnas, att när jag här har skisserat en kategori människor som är tävlingsmänniskor, och en annan som inte alls är tävlingsmänniskor, har jag skisserat två ytterlighetstyper. De flesta människor har tendenser åt båda hållen. Men de som har det svårast är de som mest entydigt hör till den andra kategorin.

Men man kan nästan säga att motivationen för förvärvsarbete skapar ett hittills ouppmärksammat klassamhälle i samhället. Klasskillnaden här är alltså mellan de som känner sig motiverade och de som inte gör det. Denna skillnad är mycket flagrant, ty ur hälsosynpunkt och livskvalitetsmässig synpunkt är det en helt annan sak att göra något som man känner sig motiverad för än att göra något man måste tvinga sig till (för att andra människor eller samhället tvingar en till det).

I det sistnämnda fallet känner man sig som en slav, i det förstnämnda fallet som en fri människa. Man kan inte förutsätta att individen själv genom något slags trollerikonster ska kunna skapa en motivation inuti sig själv-- man måste i stället vetenskapligt undersöka under vilka omständigheter människor känner motivation eller inte, och försöka skapa sådana omständigheter där de kan göra det.

-- Håkan Sundin  

Author's response
"Interesting," replies the author, but notes that his research was based on prevailing assumptions about work and the needs of both society and the individual. In any event, the results indicate that low motivation to work is not due to laziness.
Författarens svar
Dessa är intressanta funderingar. Men min studie är gjord i ett samhälle där en stark arbetsmotivation ses som en förutsättning för individuell och samhällelig välfärd och det är utifrån dessa förutsättningar som mina resultat tolkas. Sedan är det en helt annan fråga om detta är ett eftersträvansvärt samhällssystem eller ej. Arbetsmotivation är ett komplext begrepp som måste sättas in i det sociala sammanhang som individen befinner sig i. Det vi har sett är att en relativt låg arbetsmotivation (vilket trots mina resultat återfinns hos vissa individer) bottnar i något annat än att individen är för lat för att arbeta!

-- Mikael Nordenmark
   

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Commentary

By Peter Mayers,
Oakland, California

Confronting a 900-pound gorilla:
Advice from a former Social Democrat

I enjoyed reading ”The Price of Everything”. It is very well-written, and extremely insightful on a whole range of points. I beg to differ on a few of those points, however. In my view, the great achievements of the "Swedish Golden Age" must be credited (at least to a substantial extent) not so much to the labour movement and the Social Democratic Party as to certain other forces in the world which did the heavy lifting against the United States, Big Capital, etc.

It was the combination that did it, I suspect. That is, while others were doing the heavy lifting, the virtues of Swedish Social Democracy could come into their own. But such virtues as consensus and mildness, which have been central features of the ”Swedish model”, have very different consequences today, when the world is groaning under the domination of the United States’ global neo-liberal imperialism.

Under present circumstances, in any case, the prime need is for virtues of a quite different kind. And I would be frankly surprised if these were soon to make any prominent appearance either among Swedes in general, or Social Democrats in particular.



Social Democrats have demonstrated a chronic tendency to misread the true nature of their bourgeois adversaries
If neo-liberal imperialism is to be held back, and a space for social decency created, something extremely heavy-duty will be required, in my view-- something much more heavy-duty than Social Democrats have ever seriously contemplated. There is a great deal in the history of Communist parties which I would not at all wish to defend. But I do think that, from the very inception of the great split in the labour movement, Communists have understood this point far better than Social Democrats. The latter have demonstrated a chronic tendency to misread the true nature of their bourgeois adversaries.

I do not believe, for example, that the disastrous policies pursued by the German Social Democrats in 1914, 1918-19, and 1932-33 occurred by accident. Much the same could be said of the policies of the Austrian Social Democrats leading up to 1934. (True, they did bravely resist the Dollfuss-led fascists for four days in the end; but the effort was too little and too late.) The Spanish Socialists, for their part, did indeed react more appropriately, but it is worth noting that they were in a particularly radical mood in 1936, and the policies they pursued in the course of resisting Franco’s legions went well beyond what is usually understood as "Social Democracy."

In sum: when the adversary has proved willing to dispense with democratic niceties as soon as these are perceived to be inconvenient, the typical Social Democratic approach has proved tragically unequal to the need.

During that ”Golden Age”, the Right was obliged to play by democratic rules -- at least in the advanced industrial countries
The examples cited may sound tragic and exotic today-- echoes from a sad time when the Right had no respect for democracy -- a time which many seem to believe is immeasurably distant from Sweden in the year 2000. I believe this comfortable assumption to be false, however. I would argue, in fact, that paying close attention to the 1920s and 1930s better equips us to understand the present world situation than does focusing on the 1960s and 1970s. In the latter period, after all, the world balance of forces was far more favourable to the Left than it is today, or than it was between the two world wars.

During that ”Golden Age”, the Right was obliged to play by democratic rules -- at least in the advanced industrial countries. And who knows? Maybe the Right really meant it at the time. Today, however, the Right is showing once again that it wishes to be rid of democracy. True, this time it is seeking to marginalize democracy-- to divest it of meaning-- rather than to abolish it outright through openly autocratic means.

Nonetheless, the slow-motion coup d’état represented by imperialistic, corporate-led globalization is deadly to all democracy-- unless, by the latter, one has no more in mind than an empty shell within which plutocracy holds unchallenged sway, and bread and circuses are offered to the people in lieu of any choice as to how to order their affairs.

The present situation is reminiscent of the 1920s and 1930s in one important respect: Now, as then, we are faced with a plainly undemocratic adversary
In neo-liberal "democracy," we can choose between fifty different kinds of toothpaste, and just one way of running society. And if, at any point, a country does manage to widen the range of choices available to its people, and if a majority of its people then choose to embark on the forbidden road, the imperialists and their henchmen will respond with their usual bag of tricks: blockades, disinformation campaigns, economic warfare, mercenary invasions, ”black ops”, proxy wars, military coups, terrorism, death squads, massacres, etc. The capitalists are all in favour of democracy-- until the people vote wrong.

In sum, the present situation is reminiscent of the 1920s and 1930s in one important respect: Now, as then, we are faced with a plainly undemocratic adversary. Of course, neo-liberalism is not fascism. It is, however, flagrantly undemocratic, and it is this trait which is relevant here. For it is precisely when confronting undemocratic adversaries that Social Democratic movements have so often come up short.

Put otherwise, there seems to be something inherent in the general approach taken by Social Democrats, which leads to tragic outcomes when the going gets rough. This point may get obscured, however, by the impressive progress which Social Democrats are often able to make when the weather is fine and the sailing is smooth. Accordingly, they achieved a great many marvellous things during the Golden Age, and in Sweden most of all. But they are systematically ill-equipped for coping with storms.

The world needs some force, some movement, to perform somewhat the same function as, formerly, by the Soviet Union-- minus its horrible crimes
This is far from being a new problem. It is at least 86 years old. My reasoning here has a certain implication, moreover, and it is not a particularly pleasant one: The world needs some force, some movement, to perform somewhat the same function as the Soviet Union did formerly. The regimes in that country committed many horrible crimes, to be sure. Yet, I believe all the same that they did provide one inestimable service: They held up a shield behind which others could advance.

Come to think of it, this was a service which the Soviet Union performed on humanity’s behalf on at least two very different occasions. The decisive part it played in the defeat of Nazi Germany is widely acknowledged, of course. However, its subsequent role in checking a later empire is not so widely understood. (I suppose this amounts to a rather tragic view of history-- that something with such an evil side could have been a necessary condition for much that was good in the world.)

Someone has got to do the heavy lifting. a necessity derived from the nature of the system: capitalism is a 900-pound gorilla
There were also, of course, other actors of importance besides the Soviet Union. In particular, Third World movements for national liberation also helped to limit the reach of Western imperialism. It was the simultaneous efforts of these various forces that rendered capitalism, for a time, far more humane and mild than it otherwise tends naturally to be. These movements did not particularly co-operate with one another, of course; indeed, severe antagonisms often divided them. But the sheer fact that they existed in the world at the same time had an important effect. Their simultaneous efforts served to limit the sway of the forces which today reign almost unchecked.

Now that the East bloc has fallen away, the other two broad families of movements-- Western Social Democracy and Third World liberation movements-- have been weakened greatly. For the truth is that, in important respects, leftist movements around the world benefited from the existence of the Soviet Union. This fact may well be inconvenient; it may even be morally compromising in some sense. Yet I believe it is a fact all the same.

Someone has got to do the heavy lifting. This necessity derives from the nature of the system: capitalism is a 900-pound gorilla. With a beast like that, heavy-duty restraints and counterforces are required, or it will quite simply run roughshod over us. Needless to say, I am not recommending the re-establishment of a steely-eyed, grim, brutal, militarist dictatorship. And I have no wish to see the crimes and stupidities committed by the classical Communist movement repeated.

Swedish popular movements must learn how to inspire fear-- both among the capitalists and, at least as crucially, among their own leaders













Large and animated demonstrations are an absolutely minimum requirement, and large-scale strikes will probably be needed, as well
As for who might be able to do the heavy lifting in the future-- which movements, what countries, etc.-- well, I can only guess. My crystal ball is pretty hazy. A revolution in Brazil? A new May '68 in France, which spreads across Europe like wildfire and leads to the creation of a new leftist federation? God only knows. As the above-cited examples suggest, however, I do suspect that a large domestic economic base will be extremely helpful to have when the storm comes. I would wager, for example, that the USSR would not have lasted more than a few years but for its vast size.

In any case, these future heavy lifters will almost certainly be faced with a grim and terrifying struggle. Accordingly, they will require a number of otherwise quite unlovely traits for the successful prosecution of this struggle: intractability, pride, ”uppitiness”, contrariness, arrogance, explosiveness-- in short, a fierce and bitter resolve. Not very Swedish characteristics, it need hardly be said. Nor have such traits been on prominent display in the Social Democratic movement of any other country.

So what might "heavy-duty" mean in terms of Swedish politics? It would mean, at the very least, a forthright rejection of traditional notions of consensus-- whether between capital and labour, or between the leadership and the rank and file of the labour movement. Bluntly put, Swedish popular movements must start learning how to inspire fear-- both among the capitalists and, at least as crucially, among their own leaders. Until the leaders of the labour movement are at least as afraid of their own rank and file as they are of the capitalists, they will keep jumping every time capital twitches.

How then to inspire such fear? Well, large and animated demonstrations are an absolutely minimum requirement. Large-scale strikes will probably be needed, as well. And all such tactics will work best if co-ordinated with similar actions by like-minded forces in other countries.

Such, at any rate, are the conclusions I have drawn from the drama which has unfolded during the last decade or two in Sweden. I came to Sweden in 1989 as a fairly mild, albeit genuine, Social Democrat. Under the impact of developments during the ensuing years, however, my views have shifted substantially to the left.

-- 8 October 2000  

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Question:

In ”The Price of Everything”, you write: ”The most powerful single political force affecting Sweden and many other countries is freely granted the protection of invisibility as it goes about the business of world domination.”

While it is true that the United States is a powerful country, it is not alone in the world. Consider China and India, for example: They are very big countries and they do not do everything that the U.S. tells them to do. So is it not an exaggeration to write about ”world domination” by the United States? There are many other players involved.

-- Lund, Sweden
  
  
  
  

U.S. Defense
Planning Guidance:
  

"We must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."


"It is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO."


"The United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated."

 

Response: The Business of World Domination

It is true that the world is a very large and complex place. But ”going about the business of world domination” does not necessarily mean that any empire ever achieves a complete monopoly. Yet, that has never prevented efforts to do so.

One of the most persistent themes of U.S. politics is that ”the leader of the free world” has a right and duty to exercise world dominion, which has often been interpreted as a divine mission. One example of this syndrome is provided by Gen. Colin Powell, the influential former chief military officer, who has proclaimed that, ”The United States has been annointed by God to establish order on earth.”

Divinely ordained or otherwise, there can be no doubt that world domination is the objective of the interests which dominate U.S. politics today. That was made very clear by the first systematic formulation of U.S. global strategy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Entitled ”Defense Planning Guidance”, the high-level policy document includes the following elements:

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.

There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. . . .

NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure.

. . . The most promising avenues for anchoring the east-central Europeans into the West and for stabilizing their democratic institutions is their participation in Western political and economic organizations. East-central European membership in the (European Community) at the earliest opportunity, and expanded NATO liaison. . . .

In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil. . . .
     

    
     
See also
New York Times:

8 March 1992, ”U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop”; includes excerpts from Defense Planning Guidance

10 March 1992, ”Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics”
Defense Planning Guidance was leaked to the New York Times, which noted: ”The document is conspicuously devoid of references to collective action through the United Nations. . . What is most important, it says, is 'the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S.' and 'the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated. . '."

Caught with its plan in the global cookie jar, the administration of George Bush attempted to pass off the document as a low-level draft of minor significance. But, in fact, it had been approved by numerous senior officials, including General Powell who at the time was serving as the president’s chief military adviser, and Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense and current vice-presidential candidate.

More importantly, subsequent events have confirmed the validity of the document. With few exceptions, everything has been going according to plan. Meanwhile in Sweden, Olof Palme’s successors have been looking dumbly on or, as in the case of the Kosovo catastrophe, even adding their voices to the chorus of Pax Americana.

-- 26 August 2000  

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Question:

In Something Rotten in the State of Sweden, you refer to Sweden's "neglect to be occupied by Nazi Germany during World War II". But surely there was a lot more to it than that. Did not Sweden choose to remain neutral during the war against Hitler, and conduct extensive trade with the Germans throughout the war? It seems to me more like active co-operation than simple neglect.

-- Boston, U.S.A.
Response: Sweden during World War II

The fate of the Nordic countries during World War II is likely to be the subject of a detailed analysis on this web site at some future date. In the meantime, the short answer is as follows:

Neutrality. It is true that Sweden remained neutral during WWII, but that was not a policy adopted for the occasion. It was established well over a century earlier by Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, the former field marshal in Napoleon's army who in 1818 founded the current royal house of Sweden.

Neighbouring Denmark and Norway also wished to remain neutral, but were not permitted by Germany and England to do so. Denmark capitulated within hours of invasion by Germany; the more remote and impregnable Norway fell after two months, having first been attacked by England in a successful attempt to draw the country into the war. Finland entered an alliance with Germany as the lesser of two evils, the greater being the strong likelihood of invasion by the Soviet Union.

This meant that from early 1940 onward Sweden, with a population of less than seven million, was literally surrounded on all sides by the Nazi empire and its combined population of several hundred million. The only alternatives to neutrality were to join the empire or to be occupied like Denmark and Norway. On at least two occasions during the war, Hitler was prepared to invade Sweden; but for reasons that remain obscure, the country was spared.

     




The only alternatives to neutrality were to voluntarily join the empire or to be occupied like Denmark and Norway.
The price of relative freedom was a variety of concessions, of which the most criticised was and remains the transport of German troops via the Swedish rail system to and from Norway and Finland. The war-time coalition government's assessment was that, if such concessions were not granted, invasion and occupation were certain to follow. Apart from the wisdom of hindsight, there is little reason to doubt the accuracy of that assessment. Bruno Kreisky, the Jewish former prime minister of Austria, has stated that, "Sweden's policy during the war was entirely correct, as subsequent disclosures have confirmed."

Kreisky was one of several influential post-war leaders who found refuge in neutral Sweden while the war was raging. Others include Germany's Willy Brandt and Norway's Trygve Lie, who became the first secretary-general of the United Nations. Sweden also provided a safe haven for the entire Jewish population of Denmark, that majority of Norway's Jewish population which avoided transport to the concentration camps, tens of thousands of Finnish children and Norwegian citizens of all ages, and many others. The total number of lives directly saved as a result of Swedish neutrality is difficult to calculate exactly, but is estimated at well over 200,000-- not to mention the millions of Swedes who were also spared.

     
The total number of lives directly saved as a result of Swedish neutrality is estimated at well over 200,000. Probably the most widely-known contribution in this regard was that of Raoul Wallenberg who, as a diplomat in Hungary, saved the lives of up to 100,000 Jews by issuing temporary Swedish passports. Towards the end of the war, some 30,000 Nordic citizens were rescued from German concentration camps by the Swedish Red Cross. These and other contributions would not have been possible if Sweden had not remained neutral.

During the war, the western allies were quite prepared to accept Sweden's adherence to its long-standing tradition of neutrality. The only alternative would have been to incorporate all of Sweden's human and natural resources into the Nazi war machine; also, Stockholm was a valuable listening post just a few hundred miles from Berlin.

But since the war's end, some interests in England, the United States and even Israel have found it convenient to accuse Sweden of cowardice that prolonged the war and, by inference, of passive complicity in the Holocaust. There is exactly no reason to take such accusations seriously, especially in the case of the United States (see Addendum, below).

     


Sweden's trade with Germany was not merely its right under international law; it also became a necessity when the allies established an effective blockade around the Scandinavian peninsula.
Trade. The whole point of remaining neutral is to avoid making enemies of other states. But Sweden's trade with Germany was not merely its right under international law; it also became a necessity when the allies established a highly effective blockade around the Scandinavian peninsula. Apart from that, Germany would never have tolerated a unilateral economic boycott from neutral Sweden. Access to the high-quality iron ore of northern Sweden was a major priority of the Nazi war machine, and the offer to buy it was one that simply could not be refused. Even the great British warrior, Winston Churchill, acknowledged this fact and condoned the compulsory trade.

In short, continued trade was probably the most effective guarantee of Sweden's neutrality. In addition, it provided travelling Swedish businessmen with personal contacts and other opportunities to gather information about developments in the very heart of the empire. It appears that some of the first reports on the horrors taking place in the concentration camps were carried to the outside world by just such businessmen. These early warnings were apparently ignored by the United States. But they were acted upon by the Swedish Foreign Ministry; Raoul Wallenberg's mission in Hungary was one of several measures taken as a result.

War profits were made in Sweden-- most notably by the business empire of the Wallenberg family of which Raoul was a member, and which has since attained an overwhelmingly dominant position in the country's economy. But war profits were also made in England and the United States. The extensive trade between Nazi Germany and major U.S. corporations have been the subject of several books and a Congressional investigation. But those well-documented sins do not seem to attact much attention.

     






A stone's through from the statue honouring Raoul Wallenberg in Washington, U.S. congressman have demanded an explanation for Sweden's behaviour during the war.
Survival guilt and moral posturing. In recent years, the behaviour of the few European countries which managed to remain neutral during the war has once again come under scrutiny, especially in connection with efforts by Jewish survivors and their families to recapture at least a portion of their economic losses. Switzerland has been the primary object of attention, but Sweden has also been publicly called to account for accepting payment in "Nazi gold" extracted from Jewish victims. A stone's throw from the statue honouring Raoul Wallenberg in Washington, U.S. congressman have demanded an explanation for Sweden's connection, however slight and indirect, with the Holocaust.

But it is difficult to see how Sweden could have refused payment for its iron ore in the most widely-accepted means of payment for international trade, or in any other legal tender. Presumably, there would have been an equally horrifying tale of human suffering lurking in a sack of Polish zlotys or Russian rubles-- as in a sack of U.S. dollars during the Vietnam War, the genocide of Guatemala's native Indians, or any of the other past, present or future crimes against humanity by the United States.

For those who have grown up with searing images of the Holocaust etched into their consciousness, it may be difficult to understand that the world outside of Germany-- including the leaders of Sweden's Jewish community-- had little awareness of its nature and extent until the final years of the war. But it should not be more difficult to grasp than the seeming unawareness of most U.S. citizens concerning the atrocities committed in their name throughout nearby Latin America. Indeed, information about those crimes has been far more widely available.

     
The survival guilt of Swedes has probably been one of the key factors behind their extraordinary involvement in issues of peace, disarmament and international solidarity in the decades following the war. In short, the moral posturing of the United States in these matters is particularly inappropriate for a variety of reasons. It, too, remained neutral for over one-third of the war, declining to participate until it was directly attacked. Apart from the failure to act on early reports of the Holocaust conveyed by Swedish businessmen, it refused to admit a boatload of Jewish refugees who were then shipped back to Germany and extinction.

The United States' role in smuggling Nazi war criminals to safety in North and South America, in many cases with the help of the Vatican, is well-documented. U.S. citizens of Japanese (but not of German) descent were rounded up, divested of their property and interred in concentration camps for the duration of the war. And the United States of America has not even begun to deal with its enormous crimes against humanity in Indokina, Latin America and other parts of the Third World.

In any event, it is fairly obvious that Sweden's options during World War II were extremely limited. Despite that predicament, many Swedes have experienced a form of survival guilt in reaction to their country's submissive behaviour during the war. Guilt feelings, in general, come easily to the Swedes; and in this case, they have been nurtured on a regular basis by assorted historians, journalists and other brave souls who, from the safe and shadowy distance of more than half a century, have been eager to condemn their countrymen for not standing up to the Nazis.

Whatever the justification for such reproaches, it is safe to conclude that the survival guilt of Swedes has been one of the key factors behind their extraordinary involvement in issues of peace, disarmament and international solidarity in the decades following the war-- at least until the assassination of Olof Palme in 1986.

     -- August 23, 1998      




* * *
  
ADDENDUM:
The not-indispensable, but quite insufferable, nation


Excerpts from an essay by Benjamin Schwarz, Literary Editor of The Atlantic Monthly

Published in
Los Angeles Times,
22 June 2000
"A national mythology has emerged that in 1941 the United States, appalled by the horrific policies of the Nazis, deliberately embarked on a crusade to rid the world of Hitler and to stop the Holocaust. . . . Having beat Hitler and made possible a better world, the United States remains to this day what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declares 'the indispensable nation.'

"Some reminders are in order.

"First, of course, such a view slights the anti-Japanese dimension of the U.S. war, which was the real reason the United States had gone to war in the first place. Nazi Germany declared war on the United States in accord with its treaty with Japan; only then did the U.S. declare that Germany was its enemy, too. For most Americans, the purpose of the war remained to exact revenge on the Japanese.

"Second, stopping the mass murder of the Jews didn't figure in any way in either American war aims or conduct….

"In contemplating how our WWII role influences our conduct in the contemporary world, Americans should remember that self-righteousness is bad enough, but when it springs largely from a self-serving mythology, it is insufferable."
   

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